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Mixture Models of Choice under Risk 
 
 
Anna Conte, John D Hey and Peter G Moffatt 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 As is clear from Starmer (2000), the past five decades have witnessed intensive theoretical 
and empirical research into finding a good descriptive theory of behaviour under risk.  Since the 
general acceptance of the criticisms of Expected Utility made by Allais (for example, in Allais 
1953) and others, theorists have been active in developing new theories to explain the deficiencies 
of Expected Utility theory.  Hey (1997) provides a list2 of the major theories at that time: Allais' 
1952 theory, Anticipated Utility theory, Cumulative Prospect theory, Disappointment theory, 
Disappointment Aversion theory, Implicit Expected (or linear) Utility theory, Implicit Rank Linear 
Utility theory, Implicit Weighed Utility theory, Lottery Dependent EU theory, Machina's 
Generalised EU theory, Perspective theory, Prospect theory, Prospective Reference theory, 
Quadratic Utility theory, Rank Dependent Expected (or Linear) Utility theory, Regret theory, SSB 
theory, Weighted EU theory, Yaari's Dual theory.  All these theories were motivated by the inability 
of Expected Utility theory to explain all observed behaviour.  This burst of theoretical activity took 
place in the last thirty of years or so of the 20th century.  Since then, activity has been concentrated 
more on discovering which of these theories are empirically most plausible and robust – see, for 
example, Hey and Orme (1994).  This period of empirical work revealed clearly that there is 
considerable heterogeneity of behaviour both between individuals and within individuals.  By 
‘heterogeneity between individuals’ we mean that people are different, not only in terms of which 
type of preference functional that they have, but also in terms of their parameters for these 
functionals.  By ‘heterogeneity within individuals’ we mean that behaviour may be different even 
                                                 
2 Full references can be found in Hey (1997). 
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for the same choice problem.  Econometric investigation has to take these heterogeneities into 
account. 
 Some of the empirical literature adopted the strategy of trying to find the best preference 
functional individual by individual; see, for example, Hey and Orme (1994) and Gonzales and Wu 
(1999).  Another part of the literature attempted to find the best preference functional across a group 
of individuals, by, in some way, pooling or aggregating the data; see, for example, Harless and 
Camerer (1994).  In fitting data subject by subject, the problem of heterogeneity within subjects 
becomes immediately apparent in two different ways.  First, when confronted with the same 
decision problem on different occasions, people respond differently.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, it was soon realised that none of the long list of preference functionals listed above 
fitted any (non-trivial) data exactly.  Economists responded in their usual fashion – by declaring that 
individuals were noisy in their behaviour, or that they made errors of some kind when taking 
decisions.  At this point, interest centred on ways of describing such noise and incorporating it into 
the econometric investigation.  A number of solutions were proposed: the constant-probability-of-
making-a-mistake model of Harless and Camerer (1994), the Fechner-error model adopted by Hey 
and Orme (1994), and the random-preference model of Loomes and Sugden (1998).  In the first of 
these, subjects in experiments are thought of as implementing their choices with a constant error; in 
the second, subjects were perceived as measuring the value of each option with some error; in the 
third, subjects were thought of as not having precisely defined preferences, but preferences drawn 
randomly from some probability distribution.  The tremble model, analysed in Moffatt and Peters 
(2001), can be considered like the constant-probability model but perhaps appended to one of the 
other two types.  A useful discussion of the relative merits of these different models can be found in 
Ballinger and Wilcox (1997), which concludes that the constant-probability model on its own is 
dominated by the other two approaches.  Further results can be found in Buschena and Zilberman 
(2000). 
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 Those economists who followed the measurement error story soon realised that the error 
might not be homoscedastic and could well depend on the nature of the choice problem (see, for 
example, Hey 1995).  Indeed, Blavatskyy (2007) argues that, with the appropriate heteroscedastic 
error specification, Expected Utility theory can explain the data at least as well as any of the 
generalisations (after allowing for degrees of freedom).  Not all would go as far as this, but the 
incorporation of some kind of error story has led to the demise of many of the theories noted in the 
list above.  Two remain pre-eminent: Expected Utility theory – henceforth EU, and Rank 
Dependent Expected Utility theory (Quiggin 1982) – henceforth RDEU.  Machina (1994) 
comments that the Rank Dependent model is “the most natural and useful modification of the 
classical expected utility formula”.  In certain contexts, for example the Cumulative Prospect theory 
of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the theory is enriched with a context-dependent reference point.  
Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that EU and RDEU remain the leading contenders for the 
description of behaviour under risk. 
 As we have already remarked, some of the investigations of the appropriate preference 
functional have taken each individual separately and have carried out econometric work individual 
by individual.  There are problems here with degrees of freedom and with possible over-fitting. 
Other investigations have proceeded with pooled data – from a set of individuals.  The problem 
with this latter approach, even though it saves on degrees of freedom, is that individuals are clearly 
different.  They are different, not only in terms of which type of preference functional that they 
have, but also in terms of their parameters for these functionals.  The latter can be taken care of by 
assuming a distribution of the relevant parameters over the individuals concerned and in estimating 
the parameters of this distribution (of the underlying economic parameters).  This heterogeneity 
may depend on observable and observed (demographic) characteristics of the individuals or it may 
just be unobserved heterogeneity.  In either case, estimating the parameters of the distribution saves 
on degrees of freedom compared with estimating the underlying economic parameters for each 
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individual.  Moreover, the resulting estimates may be preferred if they are going to be used for 
predicting the behaviour of the same, or a similar, group of individuals.  Some economists are now 
taking into account such heterogeneity.  The dangers of not so doing are well illustrated by Wilcox 
(2006), who shows that serious distortions in the econometric results may well be the consequence.  
Similarly, the paper by Myung et al (2000) shows clearly the problems with fitting a single agent 
model to a heterogeneous population. 
 Taking into account the fact that different individuals may have different preference 
functionals is more difficult.  In this paper we adopt a solution: that of using a Mixture Model – see 
McLachlan and Peel (2000). We emphasise that we are by no means the first to use such a solution 
in such a context – a very useful reference is Harrison and Rutstrom (2007), which includes a 
discussion of the previous use of mixture models in economics3.   
 We restrict attention to EU and RDEU, and we proceed by assuming that a proportion (1-p) 
of the population from which the sample is drawn have EU preference functionals, and the 
remaining proportion have RDEU preference functionals.  The parameter p is known as the mixing 
proportion and it is estimated along with the other parameters of the model.  Obviously the method 
can be extended to more than two functionals, but the purpose of this paper is to illustrate the power 
of the approach.  Moreover, within each model we shall assume heterogeneity of parameters.  Thus 
we take into account both types of heterogeneity between individuals, without sacrificing degrees of 
freedom, and without getting distorted results.  Finally, to take into account heterogeneity within 
subjects we shall incorporate both a Fechner-type error and a tremble. 
 We illustrate the approach with data from an experiment reported in Hey (2001).  The next 
section describes the experiment.  Section 3 details the specification of EU and RDEU, while 
                                                 
3 We note that, while this paper and that of Harrison and Rutstrom (2007), are similar in many respects, there are 
differences, in particular that we include unobserved heterogeneity of parameter values across individuals. They, 
however, include demographic effects, which we do not. 
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Section 4 discusses econometric detail, including the application of the Mixture Model (with 
unobserved heterogeneity) in this context.  Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The experiment and the data 
 The data used in this study, previously analysed by Hey (2001) and more recently by 
Moffatt (2005), was obtained from 53 subjects, drawn from the student population of the University 
of York.  Each subject faced a set of 100 pairwise-choice problems between two different lotteries, 
repeated on five different days over a two-week period, so that the total number of problems faced 
by each subject is 500.  The ordering of the problems changed between days and also between 
subjects.  The probabilities defining the 100 problems are listed in Table A1 of the Appendix.  All 
100 problems involved three of the four outcomes £0, £50, £100 and £150.  The random lottery 
incentive system was applied: at the end of the final session, one of the subject’s 500 chosen 
lotteries was selected at random and played for real.  For each subject and for each pairwise-choice 
problem we know the lottery chosen by the subject.  The resulting matrix, of size 500 by 53, is our 
data. 
 
3. The preference functionals under consideration4 
 We denote the four outcomes in the experiment by xi ( i= 1, 2, 3, 4)5.  In both the EU 
formulation and the RDEU formulation there is a utility function and we denote the corresponding 
utility values by ui (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).  We normalise6 so that u1 = 0 and u4 = 1.  Each choice problem 
involves two lotteries – the p-lottery and the q-lottery.  We denote the probabilities of the four 
outcomes in these two lotteries in pairwise-choice problem t (t = 1, … , 500) by p1t, p2t, p3t, p4t and 
q1t, q2t, q3t, q4t respectively. 
                                                 
4 A glossary of notation can be found in Table A2. 
5 Respectively £0, £50, £100 and £150. 
6 The utility function in both specifications is unique only up to a linear transformation.  
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 The EU specification envisages subjects evaluating the expected utilities EU(pt) and EU(qt) 
of the two lotteries in pairwise-choice problem t as in equation (1). 
 2 2 3 3 4
2 2 3 3 4
( )
( )
t t t
t t t
EU p u p u p
EU q u q u q
= + +
= + +
t
t
p
q
 (1) 
In the absence of error, the EU specification envisages the subject choosing pt (qt) if and only if 
 2 2 3 3 4 ( ) 0t t td u d u d+ + > <  (2) 
where djt =pjt –qjt (i = 2, 3, 4). 
To incorporate the fact that subjects are noisy in their choice behaviour, we add a (Fechnerian) 
stochastic term to (2), implying that the subject chooses pt (qt) if and only if 
 2 2 3 3 4 ( )0t t t td u d u d ε+ + + > <  (3) 
where we assume that each εt is independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and standard 
deviation σ.  The magnitude of σ indicates the noisiness in the choices – the larger the value of this 
parameter, the greater the noise.  We estimate σ along with the other parameters.  Later we add a 
tremble, and at the end of section 4 we note how our estimation procedure would need to be 
modified for the random preferences story of randomness in behaviour. 
 The RDEU specification looks similar to that of EU but the subjects are envisaged as 
transforming the objective probabilities in a specific way.  As a consequence, under RDEU subjects 
evaluate the rank dependent expected utilities RDEU(pt) and RDEU(qt) of the two lotteries as in 
equation (4). 
 2 2 3 3 4
2 2 3 3 4
( )
( )
t t t
t t t
RDEU P u P u P
RDEU Q u Q u Q
= + +
= + +
t
t
p
q
 (4) 
where the P’s and Q’s are not the correct probabilities though they are derived from the correct  
probabilities in the manner specified in (5): 
 
2 2 3 4 3 4
3 3 4 4
4 4
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t
P w p p p w p p
P w p p w p
P w p
= + + − +
= + −
=
         
2 2 3 4 3 4
3 3 4 4
4 4
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t
Q w q q q w q q
Q w q q w q
Q w q
= + + − +
= + −
=
 (5) 
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Here the function w(.) is a probability weighting function which is monotonically non-decreasing 
everywhere in the range [0,1] and for which w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.  Note that if w(p) = p 
everywhere, RDEU reduces to EU. 
In the absence of error, the RDEU specification envisages the subject choosing pt (qt) if and 
only if 
 2 2 3 3 4 ( )0t t tD u D u D+ + > <  (6) 
where Djt = Pit – Qjt (i = 2, 3, 4).  Once again, to incorporate the fact that subjects are noisy in their 
choice behaviour, we add a (Fechnerian) stochastic term to equation (6), implying that the subject 
chooses pt (qt) if and only if 
 2 2 3 3 4 ( )0t t t tD u D u D ε+ + + > <  (7) 
 To proceed to estimation, we now need to parameterise both the utility function and the 
weighting function.  For the former, there are two possibilities: (1) we could estimate u2 and u3; or 
(2) we could adopt a particular functional form and estimate the parameter(s) of that function.  As 
we want to have a parsimonious specification, and as we want to introduce unobserved 
heterogeneity, we follow the second route.  The most obvious contenders for the functional form are 
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA).  In each 
of these there is one parameter.  Given our normalisation, these forms can be written as in equations 
(8) and (9). 
 ( ) ( )
1 exp( )CARA:  ( ) ,0 0,
1 exp( 150 )
                     /150                   0
rxu x r
r
x r
− −= ∈ −∞ ∪ ∞− −
= =
 (8) 
 CRRA:  ( ) ( /150)ru x x=  (9) 
We will assume later that the parameter r in both formulations is distributed over the population 
(from which our subjects were recruited) and we will estimate the parameters of that distribution.  
For the CARA function, the parameter r can take any value between -∞ and +∞, and r is positive 
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for risk averters, 0 for risk-neutral agents (for whom the functions become linear), and negative for 
risk-loving agents. For the CRRA function, the parameter r has to be positive7, and r is less than 1 
for risk-averter agents, equal to 1 for risk-neutral agents, and greater than 1 for risk-loving agents. 
 For the weighting function we follow a similar route. The most parsimonious functions used 
in the literature are the Quiggin function and the Power function.  These can be written as in 
equation (10), where we call γ the weighting-function parameter. 
 1/
Quiggin:  ( ) *
( (1 ) )
Power:    ( )                      0
pw p
p p
w p p
γ
γ γ γ
γ
γ γ
γ
= >+ −
= >
 (10) 
For those subjects who act in accordance with RDEU we will assume that the risk-aversion 
parameter, r, and the weighting-function parameter, γ, are jointly distributed over the population 
from which our sample is drawn and we will estimate the parameters of that distribution.  For the 
Quiggin function, γ  must be greater than γ* (otherwise w(.) is not monotonic)8, while for the Power 
function, γ  must be positive.  For both functions, RDEU reduces to EU when γ = 1.  When γ ≠ 1, 
the Power function is either completely above or completely below the 450-line.  In contrast, the 
Quiggin function does cross the 450-line, either with an S-shape or an inverted S-shape.  This is 
often seen as an advantage of the Quiggin function.  
 In what follows, we estimate all four combinations: CARA with Quiggin, CARA with 
Power, CRRA with Quiggin and CRRA with Power, so we can test for the robustness of our 
results9.  
 
4. The econometric specification 
                                                 
7 We note that in some formulations the parameter r can be negative (in which case a different functional form is 
required). Wakker (2006) has an extended discussion of this case. However, we exclude this for a number of reasons, 
not least that the utility of zero is minus infinity, which makes it impossible to apply our normalisation and renders 
meaningless the interpretation of σ as a measure of the noisiness of the subjects’ responses. 
8 γ* = 0.279095. 
9 Here we use just four possible combinations. There are clearly other possibilities – as is discussed in Stott (2006). 
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 Let us use the binary indicator yt = 1 (-1) to indicate that the subject chose pt (qt) on 
problem t.  We start with the EU specification.  From the choice rule given by (3), we obtain the 
likelihood contribution for a single subject’s choice in problem t: 
 ( ) { }2 2 3 3 4P( | , ) / 1, 1t t t t t ty r y d u d u d yσ σ= Φ + + ∈ −    (11) 
where Φ(.) is the unit normal cumulative distribution function.  Note that this depends on the risk 
aversion parameter r and the standard deviation of the error term σ.  We now introduce a tremble.  
By this we mean that the individual implements the choice indicated by equation (3) with 
probability (1-ω), and chooses at random between the two lotteries with probability ω. The 
parameter ω is called the “tremble probability”.  Introducing this parameter into (11), the likelihood 
contribution becomes: 
 { }2 2 3 3 4P( | , , ) (1 ) [ ( ) / ] / 2 1, 1t t t t t ty r y d u d u d yσ ω ω σ ω= − Φ + + + ∈ −  (12) 
Following the same route for the RDEU specification, we obtain the likelihood contribution: 
 { }2 2 3 3 4P( | , , , ) (1 ) [ ( ) / ] / 2 1, 1t t t t t ty r y D u D u D yγ σ ω ω σ ω= − Φ + + + ∈ −  (13) 
Note that the rank-dependent parameter γ  now enters the likelihood in (13), through the D variables 
defined in (5) and (6). 
 We now assume that, for the population of EU individuals, the parameter r (ln(r) in the case 
of the CRRA specification) is distributed normally over the population with mean θ and variance δ2, 
and we denote this normal density function as  f(r;θ, δ).  For the population of RDEU individuals, 
we assume that the parameters r and γ  have a joint distribution, such that the two quantities r (ln(r) 
in the case of the CRRA specification) and ln(γ - γmin) have a bivariate normal distribution, where 
γmin is 0 in the Power case and γ* in the Quiggin case (see (10)).  The parameters of this bivariate 
normal are specified for CARA in (14) and for CRRA in (15):  
 ( )
2
2
min
~ ,
ln
r S
N
M S S
ρ
γ γ ρ
 Θ    ∆ ∆      − ∆      
 (14) 
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 ( )
2
2
min
ln( )
~ ,
ln
r S
N
M S S
ρ
γ γ ρ
 Θ    ∆ ∆      − ∆      
 (15) 
 
The joint density function of r and γ  will be denoted as g(r,γ;Θ, ∆, M, S, ρ).  Note that this function 
is not actually a bivariate normal density, since it is not the case that both arguments are normally 
distributed; either one or both arguments are log-normally distributed.  Note that this formulation is 
assuming that the distribution of the risk-aversion parameter for the EU subjects may be different 
from that for the RDEU subjects. 
Finally we assume that a proportion p of the population is RDEU and a proportion (1-p) is 
EU.  Hence, the contribution to the likelihood for any given subject is as given in (16). 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
min
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
, , , , , , , , ,
(1 ) 1 / / 2 ; ,
1 / / 2 , ; , , , ,
t t t t
t
t t t t
t
L M S p
p y d u d u d f r dr
p y D u D u D g r M S d dr
γ
θ δ ρ σ ω
ω σ ω θ δ
ω σ ω γ ρ γ
∞
=−∞
∞ ∞
=−∞
Θ ∆ =
  − − Φ + + +     
  + − Φ + + + Θ ∆     
∏∫
∏∫ ∫
 (16) 
 The overall log-likelihood for all 53 subjects is just the sum of the log of L given by (16) 
over all 53 subjects.  Estimation proceeds by maximum simulated likelihood10 (see Gourieroux and 
Monfort, 2002, for the general principles) because of the computational problems with the double 
integral in the likelihood function.  We estimate the parameters θ, δ, Θ, ∆, M, S, ρ, ω, σ, and p.  The 
program (written in GAUSS) is available on request.  We carry out estimation for all four 
combinations of the utility function and the weighting function. 
 A final note before proceeding is in order.  It would be possible to modify our formulation to 
take into account the random preference model of Loomes and Sugden (1998) – where subjects are 
envisaged as taking a fresh drawing from his or her set of preferences on every problem – by re-
writing (16) as in (17).  
                                                 
10 Integration over the distribution of r in the EU model and over the joint distribution of r and γ in the RDEU model is 
performed by simulation. In particular we use 100 draws for each subject based on Halton sequences (Train 2003). 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
min
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
, , , , , , , , ,
(1 ) 1 / / 2 ; ,
1 / / 2 , ; , , , ,
t t t t t
t
t t t t t
t
L M S p
p y d u d u d f r dr
p y D u D u D g r M S d dr
γ
θ δ ρ σ ω
ω σ ω θ δ
ω σ ω γ ρ γ
∞
=−∞
∞ ∞
=−∞
Θ ∆ =
 − − Φ + + +   
 + − Φ + + + Θ ∆   
∏∫
∏∫ ∫
 (17) 
Note the difference: in formulation (16) it is as if the subject’s preferences are a random drawing 
from the set of all preferences, but these preferences then remain fixed for the duration of the 
experiment; while in (17) there is a fresh drawing on every choice problem. 
 
5. Results 
 The results for the CRRA/Quiggin specification are reported in Table 1. Those for the other 
three specifications are reported in Appendix Tables A3, A4 and A5 and Appendix Figure A1.  We 
conclude from these tables that the CRRA/Quiggin specification fits best, and so we will 
concentrate the discussion that follows on this specification.  Our justification for this can be found 
in the following Table 2, which reports the maximised log-likelihoods for each of the specifications. 
The column headed ‘EU only’ (‘RDEU only’) shows the maximised log-likelihoods when it is 
assumed that all the subjects are EU (RDEU); and that headed ‘Mixture Model’ shows the 
maximised log-likelihoods when our Mixture Model, as specified by equation (16), is fitted to the 
data. Whether we assume that all the subjects are EU or all are RDEU, the CRRA specification 
clearly emerges as the better utility function.  If we assume that all subjects are RDEU, then 
Quiggin is marginally better when combined with the CARA and marginally worse when combined 
with CRRA.  However, the Vuong (1989) tests reported in Table 3, while showing that the 
CRRA/Quiggin specification is superior to the other specifications, do not show it to be 
significantly better than the other specifications. 
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However, and crucially for the purposes of this paper, the log-likelihoods in the table above show 
clearly that, for all specifications, the Mixture Model fits significantly better (at very small 
significance levels11) than either of the two preference functionals individually.  
 This is one of the crucial points of this paper, and we expand on it here – in relation to the 
CRRA/Quiggin specification. Table 1 shows that the Mixture Model fits the data significantly 
better than either of the two preference functionals individually. Hence, it follows that assuming 
that, in the population from which our subjects were drawn, agents are either all EU or all RDEU 
gives a distorted view of the truth. The mixing proportion, p, is estimated to be slightly above 0.8 – 
suggesting that 20% of the population are EU and 80% are RDEU.  Figures 1 and 2 show the log-
likelihood as a function of the mixing proportion and the peak is well-defined.  A 95% confidence 
interval for p is (0.692, 0.913).  We can use our results to calculate the posterior probabilities of 
each subject being either EU or RDEU, conditional on their 500 choices. Using Bayes rule we have 
the following posterior probabilities: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
min
1 500
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
1 500
500
2 2 3 3 4
1
( | )
(1 ) 1 / / 2 ; ,
( | )
1 / / 2 , ; , , , ,
t t t t
t
t t t t
t
P subject is EU y y
p y d u d u d f r dr
L
P subject is RDEU y y
p y D u D u D g r M S d dr
L
γ
ω σ ω θ δ
ω σ ω γ ρ γ
∞
=−∞
∞ ∞
=−∞
=
  − − Φ + + +     
=
  − Φ + + + Θ ∆     
∏∫
∏∫ ∫
?
?
 (18) 
where L is as given in equation (16). The resulting histogram of the posterior probabilities is shown 
in Figure 3.  Apart from one apparently very confused subject, that partition is close to perfect. 
                                                 
11 The log-likelihood test-statistics for the Mixture Model v EU are 988, 874, 961 and 694 (for CRRA/Quiggin, 
CRRA/Power, CARA/Quiggin and CARA/Power respectively; the critical value at 1% is 18.475 (7 degrees of 
freedom). The log-likelihood test-statistics for the Mixture Model v RDEU are 287, 143, 399 and 139 (for 
CRRA/Quiggin, CRRA/Power, CARA/Quiggin and CARA/Power respectively; the critical value at 1% is 13.277 (4 
degrees of freedom). 
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 In the Mixture Model (with the CRRA/Quiggin specification), the estimated parameters of 
the distribution of the log of the risk-aversion parameter show a mean and standard deviation of 
0.76438 and 0.32431 for the EU subjects and a mean and standard deviation of -0.95425 and 
0.53947 for the RDEU subjects. This implies a mean and standard deviation of the risk-aversion 
parameter, r, for the EU subjects of 0.491 and 0.027. It also implies a 95% confidence interval for 
the EU subjects for ln(r) given by (-1.400, -0.129) - implying a 95% confidence interval for r given 
by (0.247, 0.839). To interpret these figures it may be useful to note that, for a subject with a CRRA 
parameter of 0.247 (0.839) his or her certainty equivalent for a 50-50 gamble between £0 and £150 
is £9.06 (£68.17). An equivalent calculation for the RDEU subjects shows a 95% confidence 
interval for r given by (0.134, 1.109) – with corresponding certainty equivalents for a 50-50 gamble 
between £0 and £150 given by (£0.85, £80.29). A small fraction of the RDEU subjects are risk-
loving. 
 Again within the Mixture Model and the CRRA/Quiggin specification, our results show that 
the distribution of ln(γ - γ*) has an estimated mean and standard deviation of -0.55465 and 0.24031 
respectively. This implies that approximately 95% of the values of γ in the population lie between 
0.637 and 1.199. The implied weighting functions at these two ‘extremes’ and the weighting 
function at the mean are plotted in Figure 4. It is interesting to note that this range of the possible 
weighting functions includes the (unique) function estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It 
can also be seen from Figure 1 that the RDEU estimates also include some subjects whose 
weighting function is close to that of the EU subjects (for whom w(p) = p). The proportion of the 
population who are therefore strictly RDEU is therefore somewhat less than the 80% implied by the 
estimate of the weighting parameter It is interesting to note that the correlation ρ between ln(r) and 
ln(γ - γ*) is estimated to be 0.33793 (and is significantly different from zero). This implies that in 
general, the more risk-loving is a subject, the higher the value of the weighting parameter. 
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 Finally we should comment on the within-subject errors. The estimates of σ (the standard 
deviation of the Fechnerian error) are 0.07438 and 0.03398 for the EU and RDEU subjects 
respectively. These have meaning with respect to the normalisation of the utility function – 
constrained to lie between 0 and 1 for the outcomes in the experiment. So, for example, a 50-50 
gamble between £0 and £150, which has an expected utility of 0.5, is valuated by subjects to have 
an expected utility with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.07438 (0.03398) by the EU (RDEU) 
subjects. So the EU [RDEU] subjects evaluate it with 95% probability in the range (0.354, 0.646) 
[(0.433, 0.567)]. This error appears in line with previous estimates. The tremble probability is 
estimated to be 0.01139 – indicating a tremble of just over 1%. 
 As we have already noted, the CRRA/Quiggin specification appears superior to the others. 
Appendix Tables A3, A4 and A5 rather obviously show variations in the estimates obtained, 
particularly in the estimates of the mixing parameter. But all specifications show clearly that the 
Mixture Model fits the data better than either of the two models (assuming subjects are either all EU 
or all RDEU). To demonstrate this result is one of the main purposes of this paper. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper started from the observation that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
behaviour of subjects in experiments12. This heterogeneity is both within subjects and between 
subjects. If we want to use the data to estimate the underlying preference functionals of subjects, we 
need to take this heterogeneity into account. Heterogeneity within subjects can be incorporated by 
appending some kind of error story into our analysis. This is already a common feature of empirical 
work in this area. As for heterogeneity between subjects, if we wish to save on degrees of freedom 
by pooling our data in some way, we cannot ignore this heterogeneity. This heterogeneity can be 
taken into account by modelling the parameters as being distributed within the population from 
                                                 
12 The same is true in data obtained from other sources. 
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which our subjects are drawn. This kind of heterogeneity has already been considered in the 
literature (see Botti et al, 2007). Heterogeneity of preference functionals across individuals is more 
difficult to take into account, and this we do by using a Mixture Model (like and Harrison and 
Rutstrom, 2007) - we assume that different agents in the population have different functionals and 
we estimate the proportion of each type. This is the main contribution of the paper. We show that 
such a Mixture Model adds significantly to the explanatory power of our estimates. We thus present 
a method of using the data to take into account all forms of heterogeneity.  
 We have applied the Mixture Model to the problem of estimating preference functionals 
from a sample of 53 subjects for each of whom we have 500 observations. Our results show that it 
is misleading to assume a representative agent model – not all agents are EU and not all agents are 
RDEU – there is a mixture in the population. Moreover, there is significant heterogeneity in both 
the risk-aversion parameter and the weighting function parameter. And, of course, there is 
considerably heterogeneity of behaviour within subjects.  Our estimations take all these forms of 
heterogeneity into account13. 
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13 Clearly there is scope for further investigations. For example, one of the parameters that we have assumed the same 
for all members of the population, ω, might also be distributed over the population. 
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Table 1: Estimates for CRRA Quiggin Specification 
 
Parameter estimates. Maximum simulated likelihood. 
CRRA specification. Quiggin weighting function. 
(53 individuals, 500 observations each, standard errors in parentheses) 
 mixture model 
 
EU only RDEU only EU-type RDEU-type
θ (EU) Θ (RDEU) -1.15599 (0.07217) 
-0.95338 
(0.02332) 
-0.76438 
(0.09492) 
-0.95425 
(0.01996) 
δ (EU)  ∆ (RDEU) 0.55348  (0.03040) 
0.54652 
(0.01755) 
0.32431 
(0.06369) 
0.53947 
(0.01500) 
M 
 - 
-0.49629 
(0.02043) - 
-0.55465 
(0.03041) 
S - 0.24676 (0.01965) - 
0.24031 
(0.01820) 
ρ  - 0.25563 (0.10011) - 0.33793 (0.08296) 
ω 0.01375 (0.00173) 
0.01534 
(0.00184) 
0.01139 
(0.00157) 
σ 0.04823 (0.00089) 
0.04134 
(0.00089) 
0.07438 
(0.00297) 
0.03398 
(0.00081) 
p - - 0.80266 (0.05623) 
Log-likelihood -7210.27887 -6860.18750 -6716.49907 
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Table 2: The Maximised Log-Likelihoods for the Different Specifications 
 EU only RDEU only Mixture Model 
CRRA/Quiggin -7210.27887 -6860.18750 -6716.49907 
CRRA/Power -7210.27887 -6845.15422 -6773.37108 
CARA/Quiggin -7766.48390 -7485.00936 -7285.69205 
CARA/Power -7766.48390 -7488.98040 -7419.30892 
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Table 3: Vuong Tests Between the Various Specifications 
Vuong Tests 
 
H0: model1 and model2 are equally close to the true model 
H1: model1 is closer to the true model than model2 
model1/model2 Voung_statistic p-value 
cara_quiggin/cara_power 0.16708 0.43365 
crra quiggin /crra power 0.03012 0.48799 
crra_quiggin/cara_quiggin 0.28884 0.38635 
crra_quiggin/cara_power 0.32326 0.37325 
crra power/cara quiggin 0.19832 0.42140 
crra power/cara power 0.60596 0.27227 
 
The Vuong-statistic is distributed N(0,1) under the null hypothesis – One-sided test 
 
 
Figure 1: Log-likelihood function (CRRA Quiggin) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Log-likelihood function (CRRA Quiggin) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Posterior Probabilities (CRRA Quiggin) 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The 100 choice problems14 
 
t q1 q2 q3 q4 p1 p2 p3 p4   
 
1 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .000 .875  
2    .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .000 .875  
3 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .500 .375  
4 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .000 .625  
5 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .125 .500  
6 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .250 .375  
7 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .625 .000 .375  
8 .000 .125 .500 .375 .000 .375 .000 .625  
9 .000 .125 .500 .375 .000 .375 .125 .500  
10 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .000 .625  
11 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500  
12 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375  
13 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125  
14 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .000 .375  
15 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .125  
16 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .000 .625  
17 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500  
18 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375  
19 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125  
20 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125  
21 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .625 .000 .375  
22 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .875 .000 .125  
23 .000 .375 .500 .125 .000 .625 .000 .375  
24 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .250 .750 .000  
25 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000 .375 .250 .375  
26 .000 .000 .500 .500 .125 .000 .250 .625  
27 .000 .000 .500 .500 .125 .000 .250 .625  
28 .000 .000 .875 .125 .125 .000 .250 .625  
29 .000 .000 .875 .125 .125 .000 .625 .250  
30 .000 .000 .875 .125 .375 .000 .375 .250  
31 .000 .000 .875 .125 .500 .000 .000 .500  
32 .000 .000 .875 .125 .750 .000 .000 .250  
33 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .125 .000 .250 .625  
34 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .125 .000 .625 .250  
35 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .375 .000 .375 .250  
36 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500  
37 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250  
38 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250  
39 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125  
40 .125 .000 .625 .250 .500 .000 .000 .500  
41 .250 .000 .750 .000 .375 .000 .375 .250  
42 .250 .000 .750 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500  
43 .250 .000 .750 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250  
44 .250 .000 .750 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125  
45 .375 .000 .375 .250 .500 .000 .000 .500  
46 .375 .000 .625 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500  
47 .375 .000 .625 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250  
48 .375 .000 .625 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125  
49 .250 .000 .750 .000 .375 .000 .625 .000  
                                                 
14 Note that the questions were presented to the subjects in a random sequence with left and right randomly 
interchanged. 
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50 .750 .000 .000 .250 .750 .000 .125 .125  
51 .000 .750 .000 .250 .250 .375 .000 .375  
52 .000 .750 .000 .250 .375 .125 .000 .500  
53 .000 .750 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375  
54 .000 .875 .000 .125 .250 .375 .000 .375  
55 .000 .875 .000 .125 .375 .125 .000 .500  
56 .000 .875 .000 .125 .500 .250 .000 .250  
57 .000 .875 .000 .125 .625 .000 .000 .375  
58 .000 .875 .000 .125 .625 .125 .000 .250  
59 .125 .750 .000 .125 .250 .375 .000 .375  
60 .125 .750 .000 .125 .375 .125 .000 .500  
61 .125 .750 .000 .125 .500 .250 .000 .250  
62 .125 .750 .000 .125 .625 .000 .000 .375  
63 .125 .750 .000 .125 .625 .125 .000 .250  
64 .125 .875 .000 .000 .250 .375 .000 .375  
65 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .125 .000 .500  
66 .125 .875 .000 .000 .500 .250 .000 .250  
67 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .000 .000 .375  
68 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .125 .000 .250  
69 .125 .875 .000 .000 .750 .125 .000 .125  
70 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .000 .125  
71 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .000 .125  
72 .250 .375 .000 .375 .375 .125 .000 .500  
73 .500 .250 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375  
74 .500 .250 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375  
75 .000 .750 .000 .250 .125 .750 .000 .125  
76 .000 .750 .250 .000 .125 .000 .875 .000  
77 .000 .750 .250 .000 .125 .375 .500 .000  
78 .000 .750 .250 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000  
79 .000 .750 .250 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000  
80 .000 .750 .250 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
81 .000 .750 .250 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000  
82 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .125 .000 .875 .000  
83 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .125 .375 .500 .000  
84 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .250 .625 .125 .000  
85 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000  
86 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000  
87 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
88 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
89 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000  
90 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .750 .125 .125 .000  
91 .250 .625 .125 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000  
92 .250 .625 .125 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000  
93 .250 .625 .125 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
94 .250 .625 .125 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000  
95 .375 .250 .375 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
96 .375 .250 .375 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
97 .375 .625 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000  
98 .375 .625 .000 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000  
99 .375 .625 .000 .000 .750 .125 .125 .000  
100 .375 .125 .500 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000  
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Table A2: glossary of notation 
variables 
xi i’th outcome 
ui utility of i’th outcome = u(xi) 
pt P-lottery on problem t 
qt Q- lottery on problem t 
pit (qit) probability of outcome i in P- (Q-) lottery on problem number t 
Pit (Qit) modified probability of outcome i in P- (Q-) lottery number on problem t (see (5)) 
dit pit - qit  
Dit Pit - Qit 
yt decision on lottery t (1: P-lottery; -1: Q-lottery) 
εt measurement error on problem number t 
r risk-aversion parameter 
γ weighting-function parameter 
functions 
EU(.) Expected Utility function (see (1)) 
RDEU(.) Rank Dependent Expected Utility function (see (4)) 
u(.) utilitity function (see (8) and (9)) 
w(.) weighting function (see (10)) 
Φ(.) unit normal cumulative density function 
f(.) probability density function of risk-aversion parameter (EU agents) 
g(.) joint probability density function of risk-aversion and (log of) weighting-function 
parameters (RDEU agents) 
L(.) likelihood function (see (16)) 
parameters 
θ mean of the (marginal) distribution of the risk-aversion parameter (EU agents) 
Θ mean of the (marginal) distribution of the risk-aversion parameter (RDEU agents) 
δ standard deviation of the (marginal) distribution of the risk-aversion parameter (EU 
agents) 
∆ standard deviation of the (marginal) distribution of the risk-aversion parameter 
(RDEU agents) 
M mean of the (marginal) distribution of the (transformation of the) weighting-function 
parameter (RDEU agents) 
S standard deviation of the (marginal) distribution of the (transformation of the) 
weighting-function parameter (RDEU agents) 
ρ correlation between risk-aversion parameter and the (transformation of the) 
weighting-function parameter (RDEU agents) 
ω probability of a tremble 
σ standard deviation of the Fechnerian error 
p the mixing parameter (proportion of RDEU agents in population) 
Table A3: Estimates for CRRA Power Specification 
 
Parameter estimates. Maximum simulated likelihood. 
CRRA specification. Power weighting function. 
(53 individuals, 500 observations each, standard errors in parentheses) 
 mixture model 
 
EU only RDEU only EU-type RDEU-type
θ (EU) Θ (RDEU) -1.15599  (0.07217) 
-1.06849 
(0.03109) 
-0.94253  
(0.07489) 
-1.04301  
(0.05346) 
δ (EU)  ∆ (RDEU) 0.55348  (0.03040) 
0.72066  
(0.02313) 
0.46515 
(0.03238) 
0.80237 
 (0.04294) 
M 
 - 
-0.02251  
(0.02224) - 
-0.30098 
 (0.03833) 
S - 0.34156  (0.01314) - 
0.87514 
(0.02717) 
ρ  - -0.21909  (0.05699) - -0.02117  (0.02247) 
ω 0.01375  (0.00173) 
0.01235 
 (0.00333) 
0.01288 
(0.00168) 
σ 0.04823  (0.00089) 
0.04309  
(0.00089) 
0.05522 
(0.00178) 
0.03049 
(0.00125) 
p - - 0.58638 (0.07542) 
Log-likelihood -7210.27887 -6845.15422 -6773.37108 
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Table A4: Estimates for CARA Quiggin Specification 
 
Parameter estimates. Maximum simulated likelihood. 
CARA specification. Quiggin weighting function. 
(53 individuals, 500 observations each, standard errors in parentheses) 
 mixture model 
 
EU only RDEU only EU-type RDEU-type
θ (EU) Θ (RDEU) 0.02440  (0.00146) 
0.02548 
(0.00108) 
0.03618 
(0.00499) 
0.01693 
(0.00034) 
δ (EU)  ∆ (RDEU) 0.01905  (0.00142) 
0.01915 
(0.00088) 
0.02180 
(0.02769) 
0.01492 
(0.00039) 
M 
 - 
-0.46542 
(0.02492) - 
-0.10515 
(0.01987) 
S - 0.31122 (0.02058) - 
0.59426 
(0.01988) 
ρ  - -0.55347 (0.05475) - 0.10194 (0.03750) 
ω 0.01272  (0.00483) 
0.01172 
(0.00177) 
0.00724 
(0.00146) 
σ 0.06142  (0.00110) 
0.05609 
(0.00109) 
0.09635 
(0.00326) 
0.04778 
(0.00099) 
p - - 0.75248 (0.05998) 
Log-likelihood -7766.48390 -7485.00936 -7285.69205 
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Table A5: Estimates for CARA Power Specification 
 
Parameter estimates. Maximum simulated likelihood. 
CARA specification. Power weighting function. 
(53 individuals, 500 observations each, standard errors in parentheses) 
 mixture model 
 
EU only RDEU only EU-type RDEU-type
θ (EU) Θ (RDEU) 0.02440  (0.00146) 
0.02998  
(0.00092) 
0.01873  
(0.00240) 
0.03760  
(0.00114) 
δ (EU)  ∆ (RDEU) 0.01905  (0.00142) 
0.02347  
(0.00088) 
0.00853  
(0.00141) 
0.02406  
(0.00094) 
M 
 - 
-0.17251  
(0.03479) - 
-0.29090  
(0.04924) 
S - 0.36198  (0.01542) - 
0.50443  
(0.02153) 
ρ  - -0.25988  (0.08560) - -0.05176  (0.08508) 
ω 0.01272  (0.00483) 
0.01033  
(0.00007) 
0.00873  
(0.00146) 
σ 0.06142  (0.00110) 
0.05183  
(0.00122) 
0.07657  
(0.00268) 
0.04257  
(0.00170) 
p - - 0.69953  (0.07494) 
Log-likelihood -7766.48390 -7488.98040 -7419.30892 
 
Figure A1: The log-likelihoods and the posterior probabilities for the CARA and CRRA/Power Specifications 
 CRRA power CARA power CARA Quiggin 
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